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Worker Safety in Maine’s Boatyards:
Improving OSHA Compliance Efforts
by Jeremy A. Pare
INTRODUCTION
The primary goal of federal safety policy is to decrease the number of hazards facing American workers. 
The federal government spends millions of dollars every 
year to this end, yet Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), which regulates safety for the 
nation, essentially relies on standards that are not appli-
cable to all sites and operates with fewer inspectors than 
optimal. Additionally, many businesses have not been 
visited by OSHA, do not fully understand how to deal 
with existing standards, and do not have the resources to 
fully implement all aspects of the standards. According 
to personal accounts and research from 2010 to 2019, 
a lack of regulatory certainty defines the general state of 
affairs at many of Maine’s boat builders and repair shops 
(hereafter boatyards), so the number of hazards found at 
Maine boatyards remains high year after year. 
This case study relied on interviews of federal and 
state regulators, a survey of Maine’s marine trade organi-
zation members, and focus groups comprised of Maine 
boat builders to investigate more-effective and -equitable 
strategies for regulating occupational 
health and safety at Maine boat-
yards. The current approach 
employed by OSHA is widely seen 
as ineffective at stimulating safe, 
hazard-free work environments. An 
examination of OSHA’s inspection 
data for inspections of Maine’s boat-
yards from 2000 to 2016 and Maine 
Department of Labor data for worker 
injuries at Maine boatyards during a 
similar period show that many safety 
hazards at boatyards are not being 
adequately addressed by employers. 
These hazards include lack of 
machine guarding for employees 
(possible severe lacerations or ampu-
tations), lack of electrical protections 
(possible severe burns or electrocu-
tion), open floor hatches (possible 
falls from great heights); and inadequate protections for 
hands, face, and respiratory functions (possible long-
term health problems). Despite many efforts to address 
these issues at individual boatyards, the hazards continue 
to be problems for the industry as a whole, partly attrib-
utable to lack of safety knowledge or the cost associated 
with safety efforts. Additionally, few boatyards address 
uncodified safety issues such as ergonomic hazards, 
which may also lead to worker injury. 
The theory that informs this case study is important 
because the various interests involved in safety regula-
tion—economic, legal, or political—can lead to the 
implementation of differing regulatory strategies. As 
promulgated by the 1970 Occupational Safety and 
Health Act (OSH Act), OSHA’s dominant regulatory 
strategy relies on a highly centralized and rule-bound 
model of social control over America’s businesses and 
governmental entities. This strategy has been described 
by Nonet and Selznick (2001) as autonomous law, but 
is more widely known as command and control. Under 
such a strategy, decision makers regulate industries based 
Abstract
According to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Maine’s boat-
yards are a high-hazard industry, given the many potential threats their employees face 
daily. Maine’s boatyards struggle with OSHA regulations because OSHA’s command-
and-control rules leave little room for flexibility, and as evidenced by the boatyards’ 
high workers’ compensation costs and injury rates, implementation does not effec-
tively protect boatyard workers. This article investigates whether changes to OSHA’s 
50-year-old punitive regulatory strategy can influence the way boatyards self-regulate 
and decrease hazards and minimize the risk of injury to workers. Through focus groups 
and interviews, the article provides evidence that changes within OSHA’s regulatory 
strategy are necessary to decrease the hazards present in Maine boatyards. Suggested 
changes include site-specific injury and illness prevention programs and more frequent 
inspections with opportunities for boatyards to fix issues. These improvements should 
increase cooperative efforts between OSHA, the state of Maine, and Maine’s boatyards 
and reduce the number of worker injuries.
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on rules that are fully 
vetted and formally 
codified under the 
administrative proce-
dures of the federal 
government. These 
rules are enforced by 
agents who inspect 
facilities and have 
the authority to levy 
fines for noncompli-
ance with the rules. 
Over the last three 
decades, command 
and control has 
become the way legal 
scholars talk about 
state-based regula-
tion (Short 2012).
Command and 
control is an 
important regulatory 
strategy for OSHA as 
the agency has 
approximately 2,100 
inspectors who are 
responsible for the 
health and safety of more than 130 million workers in 8 
million workplaces across the country: an average of one 
compliance officer for every 59,000 workers.1 The agency 
uses the command-and-control strategy to deter firms 
from disregarding the rules it is charged with enforcing in 
high-hazard industries. The approach contrasts sharply 
with the cooperative partnership or federalism approach 
OSHA has used in the past; the authority for such a coop-
erative strategy specifically exists under the OSH Act. 
OSHA recognizes that an enhanced focus on 
prevention would reduce workplace hazards (OSHA 
2012), and the agency has investigated proactive regu-
latory programs at the state level, within private 
industry, and at the international level to gain greater 
insight into what a more responsive regulatory strategy 
would mean for American workers. OSHA’s focus on 
complex situational deterrence and liability enforce-
ment over the years has not facilitated broad-based 
compliance with its rules, especially at small- and 
medium-sized enterprises. A new focus on cooperation 
may allow firms to more effectively internalize OSHA’s 
goals and maximize social welfare. Such a strategy is 
expected to decrease the number of hazards present in 
Maine boatyards. Given the policy-making role 
Congress contemplated for OSHA in its enabling 
statute, the agency is entitled to deference regarding its 
ability to make such a change in strategy. This defer-
ence has been upheld by the courts in a number of 
cases over the past few decades and was codified with 
the term “Chevron deference” by the US Supreme 
Court (Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 [1984]). In 
these terms, it is possible to understand the broader 
theoretical significance of the regulatory policies 
opportunities to be explored in this study.  
 
WORKER SAFETY AT MAINE BOATYARDS
Data collected by the Maine Department of Labor since 2000 indicate that injuries caused by 
workplace hazards are ever present in Maine boatyards 
(see Figure 1 for location of Maine boatyards). These 
boatyards have been regulated by OSHA since 1970, 
Figure 1: Location of Maine Boatyards 
                                    Source: https://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/industry.html
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yet the data indicate that OSHA has not improved 
worker safety in boatyards to any great extent over 
time. OSHA’s regulations and current punitive regu-
latory strategy ultimately determine boatyards’ safety 
decisions, and multiple factors contribute to what level 
of effort boatyard owners choose to employ. 
The first of these factors is a direct result of OSHA’s 
individualized industry standards. Because of space 
limitations on the waterfront, boatyards often have 
inland buildings separate from their waterfront opera-
tions. Therefore, boatyards are regulated by multiple sets 
of OSHA regulations: general industry (OSHA Standard 
1910) and maritime standards (OSHA Standard 1915). 
In addition, boatyards are subject to the specific regula-
tions promulgated under direct industry standards as 
well as by standards that are adopted by OSHA indi-
rectly under its general duty clause, which requires 
work sites to identify hazards and eliminate them to 
provide a universally safe workplace for their 
employees. These regulations apply differently 
to electricians, painters, hazardous waste oper-
ators, and administrators, among others, whose 
individual jobs call for expertise and imputed 
knowledge above and beyond employees 
without these special skills. Lastly, because 
OSHA has rarely randomly inspected boat-
yards over the last few decades—due to insuffi-
cient resources—boatyards have been lulled 
into a belief that the agency will not visit them. 
If a boatyard chooses to not comply with an 
OSHA standard, or if an aspect of a standard is 
not clear to the boatyard and thus not complied 
with, it may be fined by OSHA. This is a 
chance many boatyards are willing to take.
Due to high incident rates in 2001 and 
2011, Maine boatyards have been the subject 
of OSHA local emphasis programs. This 
designation subjects the boatyards to planned 
OSHA inspections and allows boatyards to 
participate in cooperative programs (OSHA 
2000, 2011). Employees in the private boat-
building sector face many risks (Table 1), and 
OSHA consistently targets such facilities, so 
Maine’s boatyards are under constant pressure 
to protect their employees from hazards. Many 
boatyards are responding to the call for action 
by starting or expanding safety programs and 
building safer facilities. Other boatyards are 
largely ignoring the call for reducing hazards perhaps 
due to individual circumstances. 
OSHA COMMAND AND CONTROL
In the four decades since the OSH Act was signed into law by Congress, work-
place deaths and reported occupational injuries 
have dropped by more than 60 percent 
under its command-and-control regulatory strategy 
(OSHA 2012). However, the nation’s workforce 
continues to face an unacceptable number of work-re-
lated deaths, injuries, and illnesses, most of them 
preventable. Over 4,000 people die on the job each year, 
and more than four million workers suffer serious job- 
related injuries due to unabated hazards (OSHA 2012). 
Boatyards have a total injury and illness incidence rate 
of 5.9 cases per 100 full-time workers (compared to the 
Table 1:  Number of Injuries and Workers’ Compenation  
 Costs for Maine Boatyards from 2001 to 2016.
Year
Number 
employed
Injury rate 
per 100 
full time 
workers
Number 
OSHA 
recordable 
injuries 
(approxi-
mate)
Workers’ 
Compensation 
costs
2001 1584 6.4 104 $890,556.37
2002 1557 5.2 81 $494,090.73
2003 1531 5.3 82 $966,967.06
2004 1533 9.8 151 $1,476,357.65
2005 1545 10.6 164 $856,537.98
2006 1554 8.7 136 $722,611.17
2007 1555 14.5 226 $1,147,437.37
2008 1532 12.5 192 $1,328,413.17
2009 1100 12.3 136 $362,074.31
2010 1074 8.9 96 $728,746.55
2011 1128 11.3 128 $398,914.82
2012 1195 11.8 142 $577,459.11
2013 1231 8.9 110 $506,780.60
2014 1411 7.3 104 $988,440.33
2015 1493 7.2 108 $895,907.29
2016 1387 6.3 88 $722,736.84
Source: Maine Department of Labor
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national average for all private-sector industry of 2.8) 
and a days-away-from-work, restricted-and-transferred- 
activity (DART) rate of 3.8 cases per 100 full-time 
workers (compared to the national average for all 
private-sector industry of 1.6) (OSHA 2000). 
Health and safety standards that aim to reduce the 
number of injuries at Maine’s boatyards are governed 
by institutions at both the state and federal levels. The 
US Department of Labor is empowered under the 
OSH Act to set ex ante safety standards in the work-
place to reduce hazards and to enforce them through 
punitive inspections. Workers are formally protected 
at the state level by state-administered schemes 
allowing them ex post compensation for workplace 
injuries that have already occurred. The OSH Act 
allows the agency to issue standards governing work-
place hazards and to enforce these standards through 
workplace inspections. 
Inspections may actively deter firms from causing 
harm to workers through employer penalties or serve 
as an information source for identifying hazards. Gray 
and Mendeloff (2005) found a 22 percent decline in 
workplace injuries in the few years following an OSHA 
inspection in which penalties were imposed, but also 
found that this effect decays over time. Such specific 
deterrence is important, but the fact that a firm’s atten-
tiveness fades over time raises concerns about the ulti-
mate effectiveness of this approach. Such concern is 
shared by OSHA. Its own inspectors have reported 
that alterations made following an inspection are often 
temporary fixes rather than systemic long-term reforms 
(Simon 1997). This fading attentiveness has also been 
the case among Maine’s boatyards. An analysis of 
Maine Department of Labor statistics (Table 1) indi-
cates that OSHA’s inspection programs in 2001 had an 
impact for a year or two following the inspection, but 
this impact faded quickly and did not translate into a 
reduction in the incidence of injury and illness below 
the national average at any point in over a decade. The 
local emphasis program undergone in 2011 has seem-
ingly had a greater impact on the number of recordable 
injuries to workers, yet the injury rate is still more than 
twice the private-sector industrial average.  
OSHA’s bureaucratic structure has raised concerns 
about its ability to regulate a large, diverse, and far-flung 
constituency. A specific concern is that an agency with 
authorities who are remote from the day-to-day 
operations will have trouble collecting the information 
they need to regulate effectively. This information gap 
forces the agency to enact uniform command-and-con-
trol standards that apply across the board, irrespective of 
individual circumstances. It also creates incentives for 
agency staff to apply these standards in a rigid, legalistic 
way (Short 2012). A complaint of OSHA’s enforcement 
policies is that the agency relies too heavily on punish-
ment to induce compliance and often ignores coopera-
tive enforcement policies (Shapiro and Rabinowitz 
1997). Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) argue that the 
more sanctions can be kept in the background and the 
more regulation can be transacted through moral 
suasion, the more effective regulation will be. The 
authors state that, 
 Going in with punishment as a strategy of first 
choice is counterproductive in a number of ways. 
First, punishment is expensive, persuasion is cheap. 
Second, punitive enforcement engenders a game of 
regulatory cat-and-mouse whereby firms defy the 
spirit of the law by exploiting loopholes, and the 
state writes more and more specific rules to cover the 
loopholes. (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 26)
The results, the authors suggest, can lead to, “rule 
making by accretion that gives no coherence to the rules 
as a package, and a barren legalism concentrating on 
specific, simple, visible violations to the neglect of 
underlying systemic problems” (Ayers and Braithwaite 
1992: 26). In fact, this neglectful state of affairs accu-
rately describes the regulatory strategy of OSHA’s 
inspection program over the past decade as can be seen 
by OSHA’s online inspection data for boat builders 
(NAICS 336612).2 
The command-and-control model is not the only 
method to achieve safety results. Most large companies 
with noteworthy safety and health achievements see 
OSHA’s bureaucratic structure  
has raised concerns about its 
ability to regulate a large, diverse, 
and far-flung constituency.
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the use safety management systems, also known as 
injury and illness prevention programs, as the key to 
success. Convinced of the value, effectiveness, and 
feasibility of these collaborative programs, many coun-
tries around the world now also require employers to 
implement and maintain them, including Canada, 
Australia, the 27 European Union member states, 
Norway, Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea (OSHA 2012). 
Injury and illness prevention programs are not new to 
the safety community in the United States either. 
OSHA itself has proposed such programs for a number 
of years and has defined their elements as, “a proactive 
process to help employers find and fix workplace 
hazards before workers are hurt” (OSHA 2012: 1). In 
fact, OSHA acknowledges that many workplaces have 
already adopted such approaches and has even 
promoted the adoption of such plans as part of its stra-
tegic partnerships with shipbuilders in the state of 
Virginia. OSHA states, “not only do these employers 
experience dramatic decreases in workplace injuries, 
but they often report a transformed workplace culture 
that can lead to higher productivity and quality, 
reduced turnover, reduced costs, and greater employee 
satisfaction” (OSHA 2012: 1). OSHA believes that 
injury and illness prevention programs are based on 
proven managerial concepts that have already been 
widely used in industry to bring about improvements 
in quality control and environmental performance 
such as total quality management and other lean 
manufacturing techniques. 
According to OSHA (2012), the key elements 
common to successful prevention programs are
• management leadership 
• worker participation
• hazard identification and assessment
• hazard prevention and control
• education and training
• program evaluation and improvement with 
procedures for investigating incidents and 
communicating results
Each element is important in ensuring the success of the 
overall program, and all of the elements are interdepen-
dent. As every business is different, employers who 
implement programs to prevent injury and illness will 
have to adapt these elements to meet the needs of their 
organizations, as would certainly be the case with 
Maine’s boatyards.
Numerous studies have examined the effectiveness 
of injury and illness prevention programs. OSHA says 
the research demonstrates that such programs are effec-
tive in transforming workplace culture, leading to reduc-
tions in injuries, illnesses, and fatalities, and lowering 
workers’ compensation and other costs. In a 2008 study, 
researchers examined the effectiveness of a Pennsylvania 
voluntary program that provides a 5 percent discount 
for workers’ compensation premiums to employers that 
establish joint labor-management safety committees. 
Once created, these committees are then responsible for 
implementing several elements of injury and illness 
prevention programs, including hazard identification, 
workplace inspection, and adaptive management. The 
researchers found a strong association between improved 
injury and illness experience and the level of compliance 
with the program requirements (LaTourrette and 
Mendeloff 2008). 
At the end of 2012, 34 states required or encour-
aged employers to implement injury and illness 
prevention programs. Of these states, 15 require a 
written program for certain industries, mostly as a 
requirement for workers’ compensation insurance 
coverage. Many of those states offer discounts on 
workers’ compensation premiums of up to 5 percent 
for qualifying organizations that adopt and implement 
written safety and health programs. Some states 
require most workplaces to have a written plan regard-
less of workers’ compensation coverage, whereas other 
states only require them for high-hazard industries 
such as industries doing a lot of electrical work or 
handling hazardous chemicals. Other states only 
require written plans for employers with workers’ 
compensation rates above a threshold that indicates a 
high-hazard workplace: a standard that could be 
emulated by OSHA given the incidence rates in Maine 
boatyard. In the states that require formal safety plans, 
the rules also direct the regulatory agency or workers’ 
compensation insurer to provide considerable assis-
tance to employers to help them create and implement 
the plan (OSHA 2012).
OSHA AND MAINE BOATYARDS
The cooperative regulatory model is not a new concept to government, OSHA, or even Maine. 
Implemented as a pilot initiative in the state of 
Maine, OSHA’s Maine Top 200 program serves as 
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an example of the cooperative partnership approach. 
Begun in 1993, OSHA invited the 200 largest work-
places in Maine with the highest claims of lost time 
due to injury to participate in a cooperative program 
where they were given assistance in developing effec-
tive safety programs and low priority for inspection. 
All but two of the firms chose to participate in the 
Maine Top 200 program, and all showed great results 
as employers eliminated hazards at a rate 14 times 
greater than OSHA had in the previous eight years. 
Sixty percent of employers experienced a reduction in 
lost workdays (Lobel 2005). In addition, the resulting 
partnership was reported to have identified and abated 
upwards of 100,000 hazards without a fine being 
imposed (Lobel 2006). 
The Maine Top 200 program achieved results as 
the focus of changed from measuring an inspector’s 
effectiveness based on the number of violations found 
during an inspection to solving genuine safety prob-
lems in the workplace (Watson 1998). OSHA inspec-
tors participating in the program often declined to 
issue citations when they believed the fines would not 
be useful. In lieu of citations, OSHA chose to educate 
the facilities and encouraged the sharing of informa-
tion about how to deal with hazards. If one firm devel-
oped a new way to handle a problem, OSHA encouraged 
it to share its knowledge with other firms that might 
benefit (Mendeloff 1996). In addition to the changes 
within OSHA, substantial progress was made at the 
participating facilities. Management commitment to 
safety increased, worker participation was significant, 
and comprehensive safety and health plans were created 
that included abatement plans for hazards that could 
not be immediately corrected (Mendeloff 1996). The 
biggest percentage drop in injuries occurred among the 
27 firms with fewer than 200 employees. Small busi-
nesses were not specifically analyzed at the time, yet the 
Top 200 program provides some insight as to how 
OSHA can be effective at regulating small firms. As 
OSHA ultimately ended plans to nationalize the Maine 
Top 200 program due to legal challenges and changes 
in governmental leadership, the state of Maine has 
stepped in to work with firms with workforces under 
250 employees through a program called Safety Works. 
Although there is little published data available on 
Safety Works’ success at reducing hazards, data obtained 
from fiscal years 2008 to 2012 indicate that the 
program’s six consultants visited over 500 firms per 
year and helped abate more than 3,000 hazards across 
the state.
Maine’s Safety Works program is an outreach 
program of the Maine Department of Labor designed to 
reduce job-related injuries and illnesses through finding 
and abating hazards. As a voluntary program; Safety 
Works cannot issue citations or fines as OSHA can. The 
agency’s services are available by request and are free for 
firms wishing to use the agency to train their workers, 
audit their operations to find compliance deficiencies, or 
improve their safety management programs that are 
required by OSHA. In addition, Safety Works has been 
delegated authority by OSHA to determine whether 
high-performing firms can gain entrance into an OSHA 
program called Safety and Health Achievement 
Recognition Program (SHARP), which provides a 
two-year exemption status from OSHA inspections. 
SHARP status also allows firms to fly physical flags 
publicly indicating that they are safe companies to work 
for, which may attract future employees and potential 
customers. Given that enforcement is not part of its 
mission statement, Safety Works helps firms to efficiently 
and effectively manage their safety programs without 
having to worry about fines for initial noncompliance. 
Results for the program, taken from a 2010 Safety Works 
comparative report based on OSHA’s Safety and Health 
Program Assessment Worksheet (OSHA’s Form 33), 
indicate that SHARP boatyards have higher safety and 
health program assessment scores in every facet of their 
safety program than do non-SHARP organizations. 
Safety Works also represents an alternative regulatory 
strategy that OSHA can use for guidance in its attempt 
to decrease hazards found at Maine’s boatyards.
The Maine Marine Trades Association (MMTA) has 
been advocating for such cooperative safety efforts since 
1966 and has provided boatyards with information from 
OSHA, annual forums with discussion on safety topics, 
and presentations from safety professionals on how to 
improve compliance programs. Perhaps limited by only 
having one staff member, MMTA has never formally 
worked with OSHA to educate its members about how 
OSHA will interact with the boatyards, unlike in 
Virginia where OSHA and the Virginia Ship Repair 
Association (VSRA) have worked together for six years to 
increase health and safety awareness and prevent injuries 
and illnesses through hazard reduction. The data from 
this collaboration indicate that the cooperative partner-
ship between OSHA and VSRA has met these goals.
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SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
While OSHA has had an impact on how Maine’s boatyards manage safety efforts, the evidence is 
clear that OSHA must change its regulatory strategy 
to effectively eliminate hazards in this industry. Four 
specific policy recommendations arise from this study 
and include site-specific injury and illness prevention 
programs, more frequent inspections of boatyards, a 
more flexible regulatory strategy, and increased collab-
oration between OSHA and Maine boatyards. These 
recommendations do not need to be implemented 
sequentially to reduce hazards in boatyards. 
Site-Specific Prevention Programs
OSHA should require boatyards to create site- 
specific injury and illness prevention programs. Best 
management practices indicate that a written organiza-
tion-wide program would reduce hazards at the boat-
yards. OSHA should specifically develop materials to 
help boatyards develop such programs. In addition, 
OSHA inspectors should be available to meet with 
participating boatyards each year to ensure that the 
plans are living, actionable documents. Based on this 
study, Maine’s boatyards would be a willing partner in 
OSHA’s endeavors to comprehensively implement 
injury and illness prevention programs. Participants 
indicated a strong preference for more involvement by 
OSHA as long as initial steps were nonpunitive and 
undeniably beneficial to the boatyards. 
A handful of boatyards have already implemented 
such safety management programs, would be willing to 
share their plans with other boatyards, and would also be 
willing to discuss their efforts in person. One plan shared 
after the focus groups were completed mirrored OSHA’s 
suggested scope by including management leadership, 
worker participation, hazard identification and assess-
ment, hazard prevention and control, education and 
training, and program evaluation and improvement with 
procedures for investigating incidents and communi-
cating results as basic elements of the plan. That particular 
boatyard had no injuries for one year after implementa-
tion of its plan. Further, as a result of its efforts, the boat-
yard earned a special designation as a SHARP facility. 
This designation was one of only three handed out to 
boatyards in the state of Maine over the past decade 
although more have since been awarded as a result of the 
threat of the 2011 punitive local emphasis program. 
Three specific elements are important for ensuring 
effective engagement at the boatyards:
• Commitment and engagement of manage-
ment—Without a clear commitment by top 
management, accompanied by involvement 
from other site leadership, boatyards can lose 
focus and not deliver on the plan. Management 
engagement should be assured by requiring 
management to sign off on the program annually 
and send certification to OSHA. 
• Safety committees and coaching—Worker-
based safety committees are a valuable tool for 
increasing employee engagement and serve as a 
way for all staff to be coached on safety topics 
and work together toward safety goals. These 
must be made mandatory to hear from represen-
tative stakeholders at the site. 
• Continuous improvement—Making a program 
sustainable is much more difficult than initi-
ating its development. Continuous improvement 
forces employer involvement, as the plan is not 
allowed to sit unused on a shelf. This requires 
continual coaching of staff and continuous 
review of the plan. Efforts at improvement and 
resultant safety gains must be reported to OSHA 
annually with management certification.
Although injury and illness prevention programs 
have proven effective, some focus group participants 
were skeptical about the enforcement possibilities trig-
gered by a new management program. At a minimum, 
OSHA inspectors might second-guess whether the 
employers had satisfied the elements of a program as 
spelled out by OSHA. At a maximum, OSHA might 
issue two citations for one hazard: one for the hazard 
and one for the safety and health program that failed to 
flag it. There is also the possibility that OSHA’s require-
ment that employers under these programs find and fix 
all hazards would mean that employers would be respon-
sible for finding and fixing all toxic, thermal, or ergo-
nomic hazards. These concerns are valid, and OSHA 
should make it clear to all boatyards that the current 
OSHA enforcement standard will apply to the boatyards 
only when risks are not abated in a reasonable time 
frame of perhaps 90 to 120 days.
In addition, OSHA must approach its regulatory 
programs in different ways for different industries. The 
participants noted that what is applicable to marinas, for 
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example, may have little in common with the needs of 
Maine’s construction boatyards. Instead of focusing on 
the most common or serious risks across all industries, 
OSHA should allow the boatyards to focus on miti-
gating the greatest risks specific to their industry and 
workplace. OSHA should allow boatyard management 
to determine the most effective and efficient path 
forward for each company. 
Focus groups also raised concerns about the varying 
needs of different-sized companies when implementing 
OSHA regulatory programs. Often larger, high-risk-
sector companies are best prepared and have the most 
sophisticated risk management systems already in place; 
whereas smaller institutions frequently require the most 
assistance. An injury and illness prevention program 
must address the needs of both types of firms, so OSHA 
must outline broad requirements so that small busi-
nesses such will clearly understand the requirements. 
Most Maine boatyards do not have seasoned safety and 
health professionals on staff. In addition, OSHA must 
recognize the opportunity cost of time spent developing 
a health and safety program. Costs associated with the 
program, including time for employee training, increased 
future orientation training, internal inspections, 
committee meetings, and documentation, will not be 
trivial to small boatyards. To this end, OSHA can adopt 
a program based on the safety management programs 
that are working at other Maine boatyards and solicit the 
advice of Safety Works, which has worked with these 
boatyards to help create the programs. Then OSHA’s 
resources could focus on compliance assurance vs new 
and costly inspections.
For many Maine boatyards, establishing injury and 
illness prevention programs would be initially daunting. 
Any program based on formal structures can be difficult 
to establish in a small organization because of tight 
budgets and other resource constrictions. Simple, 
low-cost approaches have been effective for other small 
businesses, such as reproducible templates and forms 
based on OSHA standards. Injury and illness preven-
tion programs lend themselves to such low-cost 
approaches because they are highly flexible; the core 
elements can be implemented at a basic level suitable for 
the smallest business. 
More Frequent Inspections and Communication
OSHA should inspect boatyards more frequently 
and recommend boatyards work with Safety Works 
through targeted communications that are not linked to 
an inspection program. Focus group participants would 
accept more frequent inspections if they were preceded 
by nonpunitive audits by either OSHA or Maine’s Safety 
Works program. The nonpunitive audits are important 
as they would help sites feel more prepared for a formal 
inspection. Regular triannual inspections would provide 
a consistent regulatory atmosphere for the boatyards and 
would promote greater management accountability to 
hazard reduction within the boatyards s. While triannual 
inspections should be the norm for Maine’s boatyards, 
boatyards with injury rates consistently above the 
industry average should expect more frequent inspec-
tions. High-injury work sites must be held accountable 
for their lack of safety programming, and boatyards that 
invest in hazard reduction should be rewarded with 
fewer OSHA inspections. Boatyards in this high-injury 
category should be required to work with Maine’s Safety 
Works program to reduce the hazards at their sites.
Maine’s Safety Works program is important to this 
recommendation. The program would provide a nonpu-
nitive review of safety practices so boatyards may incre-
mentally reduce hazards in an efficient and effective 
fashion. In addition to building trust between the 
parties, Safety Works’ increased presence would allow 
the program to share best practices and enable boatyards 
to further reduce hazards beyond mere compliance with 
OSHA standards.  
OSHA’s lack of staffing for targeted inspections will 
make it challenging to fully implement this recommen-
dation. OSHA’s nine Maine inspectors will be hard 
pressed to inspect all Maine boatyards every three years. 
OSHA’s budget proposals over the past few years have 
put more emphasis on enforcement and compliance 
assistance, so it is possible that more resources for such 
an effort will be forthcoming. Everyone interviewed for 
OSHA’s current focus on  
punitive compliance fails to 
acknowledge the good-faith  
efforts of most safety managers….
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this study indicated that their goal is a safer work site, 
and this strategy will serve to further this goal.
More Flexible Regulatory Strategy
OSHA should look to adopt a regulatory strategy 
that is less rule-book oriented and more flexible. 
OSHA’s current focus on punitive compliance fails to 
acknowledge the good-faith efforts of most safety 
managers and their safety programs. Participants told 
multiple stories of OSHA inspectors identifying a 
safety infraction and imposing a financial penalty when 
the issue could have been corrected on the spot had it 
been identified by the manager or other workers in the 
boatyard. When they impose fines that do not serve a 
useful purpose, OSHA inspectors spend a great amount 
of time documenting violations rather than working 
with boatyards on solutions to the problems. Such solu-
tions will most often include improving conditional 
factors at the sites, such as poor housekeeping, but 
OSHA should also share information on behavioral 
changes necessary for reducing hazards, such as encour-
aging employees to wear proper protective equipment. 
Focus group participants acknowledged that OSHA is 
the expert, so such information sharing would increase 
employee protection immediately. It would also 
strengthen the boatyards’ safety management systems 
by reducing information asymmetries between OSHA 
and the boatyards. 
OSHA’s Maine Top 200 program is an example of 
a more flexible, less rule-book-based approach, and 
Safety Works could serve as another flexible model for 
OSHA. OSHA already looks to Safety Works to provide 
collaborative services to small firms who voluntarily 
agree to have Safety Works inspect their facilities. 
Another avenue OSHA could explore is a partnership 
with workers’ compensation firms to provide inspec-
tions as part of the boatyard’s injury and illness preven-
tion planning efforts. Inspections and any changes 
boatyards implement could serve as evidence that boat-
yards are taking their safety programs seriously. The 
inspections could also provide an incentive for boat-
yards to work with their workers’ compensation carrier 
more frequently.  
Changing its regulatory strategy will be challenging 
for OSHA as the agency has consistently employed a 
punitive strategy focused on ensuring compliance with 
its standards. During the period from 1993 to 1996 and 
Maine’s Top 200 program, OSHA showed the potential 
for more flexibility in its enforcement program, but 
recent local emphasis programs, as well as reports by 
almost all participants in this case study, indicate OSHA 
continues to focus on a punitive strategy.  
Increased Collaboration
OSHA should create a more positive relationship 
with boatyards through increased collaboration. 
Interviewees and focus group participants believe that a 
more formal agreement between Maine’s boatyards and 
OSHA would improve relations between the two 
groups. OSHA should enter into a written agreement 
with the MMTA that formalizes the hazard-reduction 
activities both parties will undertake over the next 10 
years. Such a strategic partnership agreement would 
build trust among the parties. It would also open lines 
of communication for training and information sharing 
to the individual boatyards and potentially result in a 
decrease in the boatyards’ DART rate. 
Currently, the boatyards and OSHA have a rela-
tively confrontational relationship. To overcome this, 
the parties must formally define their expectations of 
one another. OSHA and MMTA directors should meet 
to discuss their needs and come to a formal agreement 
on activities that will take place over the 10-year period. 
There should be a focus on the boatyards’ top-five injury 
events, which currently include ergonomic injuries (over 
twisting, repetitive use of tools, and overexertion in 
lifting), stationary object strikes to the head and body, 
and falls to the floor. Falls are a particular problem for 
the boatyards as the shape of boat hulls leads to safety 
hazards that traditional scaffolding and ladders cannot 
solve. The partnership can then be introduced to the 
individual boatyards and ultimately signed at MMTA’s 
annual meeting.  
As discussed earlier, there is precedence for such 
cooperation: OSHA’s a partnership with the Virginia 
Ship Repair Association. The Virginia program has 
increased the number of ship repair employers with 
comprehensive safety and health management systems 
and has kept the DART rate below the most recent 
national average for the industry. Given that Maine’s 
boatyards generally do not have comprehensive safety 
and health management systems and have a DART rate 
that is higher than the national average, such goals 
would be appropriate in Maine.   
OSHA should work with the MMTA and Safety 
Works to set up specialized trainings in the southern, 
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central, and northern Maine to increase contact between 
boatyards and the agency. Training topics could focus on 
specific needs of the region’s boatyards and should 
provide consistent and practical information. Following 
the trainings, OSHA staff would continue to be avail-
able to answer questions and help with hurdles faced by 
the boatyards.
Along with training sessions, OSHA should also 
work with the MMTA and Safety Works to create a 
communication structure that ensures boatyards receive 
notices on compliance topics and educational opportu-
nities. Electronic mailing lists or videoconferencing 
would serve this purpose quite well. Focus group partic-
ipants felt that receiving such notices, in any format, 
would be beneficial and would open positive lines of 
communication between OSHA and the boatyards. 
CONCLUSION
OSHA’s traditional enforcement program does little to reduce hazards at inspected workplaces. Rather 
than rely on its current practice of using compliance 
officers to detect and abate hazards once every decade, 
OSHA must enlist firms in a frequent and cooperative 
effort to introduce or improve comprehensive safety and 
health programs. To do so, compliance officers must be 
able to exercise more discretion on when to inspect boat-
yards, on when to impose sanctions against employers, 
and on when nonpunitive evaluation and guidance 
would be the better way to reduce hazards.
A cooperative effort between OSHA and Maine 
boatyards would build trust, increase the amount of 
relevant information being provided to the boatyards, 
and allow boatyards to receive follow-up to problems 
they face. According to focus group participants, Maine 
boatyards would welcome such nonpunitive efforts as a 
way to improve worker safety. Ultimately, OSHA staff 
would need a high level of managerial and leadership 
skill to carry out a cooperative program, as staff would 
carry out both the punitive and nonpunitive aspects of 
the compliance program. But as efforts in other parts of 
the country show, such a program could be highly 
successful for both OSHA and Maine boatyards.  -
NOTES
1. “Commonly Used Statistic,” US Department of Labor, 
OSHA, accessed February 20, 2020, https://www.osha 
.gov/oshstats/commonstats.html.
2. Searching on the NAICS 336612 for Maine at OSHA’s 
“Inspections within Industry” page: https://www.osha 
.gov/pls/imis/industry.html.
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